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There is a common empirical finding in many countries that  substantial 
increases in real per capita income do not correspond to equivalent increases 
of individual happiness. These findings have puzzled many economists that 
some have called the “paradox of happiness”. There have been a number of 
explanations regarding this paradox. This paper attempts to tackle the 
paradox of happiness by employing the idea of hierarchical choice. The 
hierarchical approach  implies that there are some basic human needs which 
must be satisfied before non-basic needs come into the picture. The paper 
argues that the hierarchical structure of needs implies that the satisfaction of 
basic needs provides substantial increases to individual happiness compared 
to the subsequent satisfaction of  secondary needs. This might also be an 
alternative explanation of  empirical findings showing a positive relationship 
between income and happiness up to certain level of income. 
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In the last decade, an increasing number of  economists have started 
to study the concept of happiness at both the microeconomic and at the 
macroeconomic level. Although one can find a number of older works dealing 
with the subject (see for instance Easterlin (1974) and Scitovsky (1976), the 
recent increase of  articles and books on happiness and economics is an 
indication of this current interest (see for instance: Oswald 1997; Kenny 1999; 
Frey and Stutzer 2000; Alesina et al 2004 and for a general review of the 
literature Frey and Stutzer 2002a, 2002b).  
One of the most discussed aspect of happiness research is the study 
of the relationship between income and happiness. There have been many 
empirical studies which examine this relationship in many countries using a 
variety of micro and macro data. One relatively common empirical result is 
that substantial increases in real per capita income do not correspond to 
equivalent increases of individual happiness. More strangely, there are 
examples where a negative correlation between real income and happiness 
were observed (see for instance, Easterlin, 1974, 1995; Oswald, 1997; Wright 
2000; Lane, 2000; Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004). As one would expect, 
these empirical findings have puzzled many economists and some have 
called it the “paradox of happiness” (e.g. Phelps, 2001; Bruni, 2002, 2004a).  
As we shall see, there have been a number of  explanations for this 
paradox. However, one might get an additional insight from the hierarchical 
system of choice. This system is based on the concept of hierarchical needs 
in which there are primary and secondary needs. The secondary needs 
become important once the primary ones have been satisfied. It can be 
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argued that income increases for lower income levels satisfy mostly basic 
needs. Thus hierarchy might explain why additional increases in income do 
not have significant effects on happiness level. With these in mind, the second 
section of the paper discusses the empirical aspects of the paradox of 
happiness as well as its main theoretical explanations. The next section 
describes the hierarchical formulation and the way that it can be linked to an 
alternative explanation of the paradox of happiness. A concluding section will 
close the paper.   
 
II. The Paradox of Happiness 
The relationship between income and happiness is basic in 
understanding the paradox of happiness. First of all, many economic texts 
assume that life satisfaction (U) is a function of income (Y) and that life 
satisfaction  is raised by income: 
 
U = U(Y) with U’ > 0 
 
The  texts do not provide a theoretical reason for the above relation. It also 
has to be noted that some economists have argued that the there is no 
straightforward  relationship between the two (see for instance Scitovsky, 
1976 and Frank, 1999).  
Given the above, there have been a large number of empirical studies 
examining the relationship across time and countries. Most studies start from 
the post war period and concentrate on  the US and European countries. One 
of the first studies which identified the paradox was Easterlin (1974). It is 
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based on post WWII US data and shows that although real per capita income 
has risen dramatically, there is no definite trend on self-reported happiness 
level. This finding also holds for more recent studies. More specifically, many 
studies indicate that there has been no improvement in happiness in the US  
for over almost half a century  although real income per capita more than 
doubled (Easterlin, 1995, p. 37-38 Maddison, 1991). Similar results hold for 
many European countries. There is no trend in a period where real income 
per capita rises in all these countries from 25 to 50% (Easterlin, 1995, p.38; 
Kenny, 1999, p.14; Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004, p.1368;). The findings for 
Japan are even more strange given the tremendous rise in real income. 
Although Japanese income increased by almost five times, there was no 
improvement in mean subjective well-being (Inglehart and Rabier, 1986, and 
Easterlin, 1995, p.40). It should also be noted that many of the above 
empirical results concerning the paradox have also been tested for reliability 
by various econometric methods (Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004; Ferrer-i-
Carbonell and Frijters, 2004; Myers and Diener, 1995) 
With these empirical results in mind, some authors such as Easterlin 
(1995) and have suggested that the relationship between income and 
happiness might be curvilinear. As Frey and Stutzer state: 
“Income provides happiness at low levels of development, but once a certain 
threshold has been passed, income has little or no effect on happiness. “ 
(Frey and Stutzer, 2002b, p.75)  
This is also supported by the fact that for US data there is a positive 
correlation between income and happiness up to the average income level of 
US $10000 (see Frey and Stutzer, 2002b, p.75). Relative to this,  the U.S  
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population who felt "very happy" peaked in 1957 and has decreased since 
then, although real income has increased continuously (Schor, 1991). 
Furthermore, many cross-sectional empirical studies indicate that more 
developed countries do not report higher happiness levels once GDP per 
capita exceeds half that in the US in mid-1990s (see for  instance, Helliwell 
2003; Kenny 1999). The authors do not provide a theoretical explanation of 
the curvilinear relationship, but as we shall see the hierarchical approach 
might serve as a basis. 
There have been a number of explanations regarding the paradoxical 
relationship between income and happiness. One line of tackling the paradox 
is based on the “subjectivist” approach  to utility which means that variables 
which are considered by many economists to be non-economic, play an 
important role in individual utility functions and thus to  the level of happiness 
(Frey and Stutzer, 2002a, 2002b). Such variables can be social aspiration, 
emotions, social stimuli, goal completion and meaning, freedom and social 
capital, loss of altruism (see Easterlin, 2001; Elster, 1998; Scitovsky, 1976; 
Loewestein, 1999; Veenhoven, 2000; Putnam, 2000; Bjornskov, 2003; 
Phelps, 2001).  
Another line of approach has to do with traditional economic concepts 
which, if incorporated, might be able to explain the paradox. Two of these are: 
the idea of relative income or relative consumption hypothesis (Duesenberry 
1949; Frank, 1985, 1997, 1999; Andrews, 1991; Kenny, 1999; Veenhoven, 
1991, 2003; Easterlin, 2001; Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005), and the level of 
inequality (Alesina et al. 2004). One can also observe here that the above 
ideas are not new in economic literature but they have been around for a long 
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time (Mason, 1998). For instance, the idea of “conspicuous consumption” 
which is related to the relative income, can be found in Rae (1834), Veblen 
(1899) and Keynes (1973). In addition, the view that  inequality has a negative 
impact on social well-being is equally old in economic thought (see Bruni, 
2004b).  
Similar to the above is the explanation based on the idea of aspirations 
and realizations. According to this outlook, happiness level has a positive 
relationship with  current income but  a negative one with aspirations about 
future income. Moreover, aspirations are based on past income. Given that 
material aspirations change over life cycle in proportion to income, it is likely 
that happiness level remain constant while income rises. The main example of 
this approach is the work of Easterlin but it also draws from work in 
psychology (Easterlin, 2001; Inglehart, 1990; Kahneman et al, 1997).  
Finally, another line of explanation of the paradox has to do with 
relational goods (for a discussion of this concept, see Sugden, 2002). The 
main idea here is that the lack of  relational goods such as close personal 
relationships, might be common in advanced countries and this may reduce 
overall well-being. This approach also draws from current work in psychology 
(see for instance Gui, 2000; Ash, 2000; Pugno, 2005).  
As we shall see in the next section, the hierarchical formulation can be 
an additional explanation for the paradox.  
 
III. The Hierarchical Approach 
     One of the standard assumptions of the axiomatic choice implies that  
economic  agents engage in full substitutability. In  the  terminology of 
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axiomatic theories, this means  that  all preferences can be substituted fully. 
Some authors have termed this type of preferences, Archimedian  
preferences (see Borch, 1968).  To take an  example, food can in  theory be 
substituted completely for perfume. In  formal  terms  Archimedian 
preferences can be stated as follows: Suppose that  we have two bundles of 
goods x and y, and that the symbol P means "preferred to". If we assume that 
 
(x1, y1) P (x2, y2) 
 
this  can be reversed by increasing x2. This implies  that  there exists an x > 
x2 such that: 
 
(x, y2 ) P (x1, y1) 
 
The conceptual basis of hierarchical choice is that human needs are of 
varying importance and that they are hierarchical. Agents have non-
Archimedian preferences when they are characterized by primary and 
secondary needs. Primary needs must reach a given level of satisfaction first 
before the secondary ones are considered. In other words, preferences are 
hierarchical in the sense that higher priority choice variables must reach 
certain levels before lower priority choice variables are considered (for a 
discussion of  the definition of primary and secondary needs, see  Max-Neef, 
1995).  
The idea of hierarchy can be found in other social sciences such as 
psychology, politics and sociology (see for instance Maslow, 1954; Tversky, 
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1969; Ardrey, 1970; Doyal and Gough, 1984; Levi, 1986; Deci and Ryan, 
2000). Furthermore, although it has not made a substantial impact to the 
established contemporary theory of choice, a number of economists like  
Little, (1957), Encarnacion (1964), Georgescu-Roegen (1966),  Chipman 
(1971), Day (1971), Gorman (1971), Earl (1986), Falkinger (1990), Pfouts 
(2002), Lavoie (2004) and others have discussed hierarchical-type 
preferences (for a review see Drakopoulos, 1994; Drakopoulos and 
Karayiannis, 2004).  
Some authors have also found empirical indications of this type 
behaviour at the household demand level, consumption and savings pattern 
(see Lluch et al 1977, Canterbery, 1979; Xiao and Noring, 1994; Jackson and 
Marks, 1999; Canova et al 2005). Furthermore, it has to be noted that 
hierarchical choice has recently  been applied to issues in health economics, 
marketing and even medicine (see for instance Scott, 2002; Baltas, 2001; 
Ratcliffe et al, 2004) 
In order to express the above in terms of goods, we assume that we 
have two vectors 
  
           x = (x1,x2,...xn) 
 x' = (x1', x2', ... xn') 
 
then x  P x' iff 
either            1)       x* > x1 > x1' 
or  2) x1 = x1' < x1*; x2 > x2' 
or  3) x1' < x1* < x1 
 9 
or  4) x1* < x1, x1'; x2* > x2 > x2' 
                                 :         :          :        :       : 
                xn-1* < xn-2; xn-1'; xn' < xn 
 
The above basic system (which is in general form) implies that when 
the first need is satisfied (the starred variables), then the second most 
important need comes to the picture. At first glance the above formulation 
might look similar to a lexicographic system of choice. However, there is a 
basic difference here in the sense that the hierarchical model allows for a 
considerable degree of substitution once the target or threshold has been 
met. On the contrary, lexicography implies virtually no substitution (see 
Encarnacion, 1964; Drakopoulos,1992). 
 
IV Application to Life Satisfaction Framework 
Apart from income, one can include a number of other variables 
to a life satisfaction function. The standard approach to an individual's 
life satisfaction is given as: 
                   U = U(Y,z)                
       
where U is life satisfaction, Y is the level of income and z is a vector of 
characteristics comprising variables that affect life satisfaction. There is 
no accepted list of these variables but as we saw it can include social 
aspiration, emotions, social stimuli, goal completion and meaning, 
freedom and social capital. These variables may or may not affect 
income.  
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The translation of the hierarchical system  into life satisfaction 
framework, implies that the individual has a priority approach to life 
satisfaction. This means that the most important  variables must be 
satisfied first before the second priority variable comes into the picture. 
This idea is also supported by empirical findings by a number of job 
satisfaction specialists (see for instance Locke,1976; Clark and 
Oswald,  1996; Drakopoulos and Theodossiou, 1997).  
In order to make a connection with the previous preference 
system, we can take a simple life satisfaction vector: 
 
                  U = (y,y*,z) 
 
where y is the most important variable which can be income, y* is the 
aspiration level of income which can be determined by a number of 
factors and z is the secondary variable which can represent a vector of 
other  variables affecting life satisfaction (for a discussion concerning 
the determination of y* see Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005).  Let us compare 
two situations. 
 
u1 = (y1,z1) and u2 = (y2,z2) 
u1 > u2 iff 
 
either   1)  y2 < y1 < y* 
or         2) y2 = y1 < y*; z2 < z1 
or         3) y2 < y* < y1 
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or         4) y* < y1, y2; z2 < z1    
 
This implies that z is considered only when y reaches a satisfactory 
level or target. We can incorporate all the  above by taking a two part 
function: 
     U(y,z) = {U1 (y,z), U2 (y,z)}       
 
where     U(y,z) = U1  for y < y*  
and       U(y,z) = U2 for  y > y* 
 
with the following conditions. 
 ∂U1/∂y  > 0,   ∂U2/∂y  > 0      and 
 ∂U1/∂y > ∂U2/∂y                                   
 
The conditions provide the essence of the hierarchical approach to life 
satisfaction. Income does not provide the same rate of satisfaction 
once a given level has been reached (although it  continues to have a 







Life satisfaction will be an upward sloped function with respect to 
income. However, its slope will be steep up to the  target level y*, but 
thereafter  the slope will become relatively flat. The change in slope at 
y* implies that y ceases to be the most important variable. 
 One potential difficulty with the empirical dimension of the 
hierarchical system might be the definition of basic needs. However, it 
has been maintained that needs lower in the hierarchy are likely to be 
common among individuals of different cultures and that needs higher 
in the hierarchy are likely to be common among individuals of the same 
culture (see Little,1957 and Georgescu-Roegen, 1966). Furthermore, a 
number of  widely accepted economic formulations have explicitly or 
implicitly assumed the feasibility of basic needs distinction. For 
 13 
instance, Keynes (1936, p.97) uses it in connection to his savings 
analysis, Duesenberry (1949, pp.19-22) in his discussion of 
consumption function, Canterbery (1979) with the welfare effects of 
inflation and Pasinetti (1981) with technical progress. In addition, a 
whole body of theoretical and empirical literature on linear expenditure 
systems employs concepts such as “basic needs”,  “necessary goods” 
and “subsistence expenditure”  (see for instance, Stone 1954; Sato 
1972 and  Lluch, 1973). 
 
V. Concluding Comments 
The central idea of the paradox of happiness is that substantial 
increases in per capita income do not correspond to equivalent 
increases in happiness levels. The paradox  has a strong empirical 
basis in a substantial number of studies. There have been a number of 
explanations which include economic and non-economic 
considerations.  
The basic aim of this paper was to offer an alternative 
explanation for this paradox. More specifically, it suggested the 
hierarchical framework as the basis of this alternative explanation. 
Hierarchical choice has been studied by many social scientists and has 
been applied in a wide variety of social and economic issues.  The 
paper argued that the hierarchical system implies that income might be 
very important variable in providing happiness up to a certain level. 
After that level has been reached, it ceases to do so and other 
variables become important. This might be consistent with many 
 14 
empirical findings that exhibit weak relation between income growth 
and happiness. In addition, the hierarchical approach might provide a 
theoretical basis for  empirical studies which point towards a curvilinear 
relationship between the two variables: income has a positive 
relationship with happiness up to a certain level of income but the 
relationship weakens after that level. It also has to be pointed that 
further empirical work might be necessary to establish the relevance of 
hierarchical explanation. For instance, the hierarchical explanation 
would gain strength  from empirical work which indicates that  income 
has a  more robust effect  on happiness in poor countries than in richer 
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